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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GILBERT LORETTO, : Case No. 960622-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Loretto claimed in Point I of his Opening Brief that a 
i I 
prospective juror's remarks during voir dire tainted the other 
jurors, and the trial court erred by denying counsel's motion to 
strike the panel. During voir dire, Ms. Bingham made an 
unsolicited remark where she associated Loretto's clothing and 
hairstyle with a neighbor whom she believed to be a Mexican gang 
member. R. 211-12. Based on those remarks, counsel moved to 
quash the panel. R. 271. In response to the State's statement 
that had the motion be made earlier the panel could be 
questioned, defense counsel, in addition to the motion to quash, 
suggested that the panel could still be questioned. R. 273. The 
court denied Loretto's motion to quash the panel. R. 275. Then 
the court asked the panel if anyone had been influenced by Ms. 
Bingham's comment. R. 281. 
The State argues that Loretto did not preserve his claim 
that the panel was tainted by Ms. Bingham's remarks for a myriad 
of reasons. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE STATE'S VARIOUS ARGUMENTS ASSERTING 
THAT LORETTO DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM THAT MS. 
BINGHAM'S REMARKS TAINTED THE PANEL ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT 
A. Loretto Preserved The Claim That Ms. Bingham's 
Remarks Tainted The Panel Because She Associated 
Loretto's Appearance With Mexican Gang Members. 
The State claims that Loretto did not preserve the 
specific argument that Ms. Bingham's remarks suggested to the 
panel that he may belong to a Mexican gang. The purpose of 
preserving objections is well established: 
The requirement of a specific objection on the 
record ensures that the trial court will 
understand the basis of the objections and have 
an opportunity to correct any errors before the 
case goes to the jury. 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988); Utah County v. 
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) ("[I]n order to preserve a 
plea of error, the alleged error must have been raised seasonably 
by counsel to the trial court . . . to allow the trial court to 
correct any error, if error there be."); Wurst v. Dep't of 
Employment Sec., 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Contrary to the State's argument, it was clear that 
counsel was concerned about the association Ms. Bingham made 
between Loretto's appearance and her neighbor's appearance whom 
she believed to be a Mexican gang member.1 Counsel argued that 
x
. Ms. Bingham made the following unsolicited comment during 
voir dire: 
I'm a very emotional person. We live next door to 
a Mexican. Still upset at them in gangs and he -
he dressed just like he did. I can't 
2 
the clear implication of Ms. Bingham's comments was that she had 
prejudice against or "concern" about her neighbor, and that she 
had the same "concern" about Loretto. R. 272. See Addendum A for 
a copy of the pertinent transcript. It is clear from the context 
of Ms. Bingham's comment that her concern did not stem from a 
dislike of Mexicans per se, or a simple aversion to her 
neighbor's taste in clothing and hair style. Ms. Bingham's 
concern arose from her association between her neighbor's 
appearance and his gang affiliation. She then made the same 
association between Loretto and her neighbor based on Lorretto's 
appearance.2 Counsel made the trial court aware that it was 
this comparison that tainted the panel. 
The court also asked defense counsel how Ms. Bingham's 
remarks about Loretto's hair tainted the panel. R. 274. In 
response, counsel noted that the hair style was unusual, and that 
Ms. Bingham had made it quite clear that to her, his hairstyle 
understand. Why can't he shave that thing off the 
back of his head? I'm sorry. I don't know if I 
could be fair. (The [juror] (sic) was referring 
to the defendant at this point.) R. 212-13. 
2
. The State also contends that Ms. Bingham's comment about 
Loretto's hair was simply an expression of a general dislike of the 
style. This contention conveniently ignores the context in which 
her remark was made. Ms. Bingham first stated that her neighbor 
was Mexican, as is Loretto. Next, she indicated that she was upset 
at "them in gangs," obviously referring to her neighbor. She then 
compared her neighbor's clothing style and Loretto's. In the very 
next breath she commented on Loretto's hair. Ms. Bingham was 
clearly not upset because she thought her neighbor's appearance was 
in bad taste. She was upset because she associated his appearance 
with gang membership. She was comparing her neighbor's appearance 
with Loretto's. In this context, it is clear that the comment 
about Loretto's hairstyle was part of that comparison. R. 212-13. 
3 
was a "negative thing." Counsel expressed the fear that the 
other jurors would also now perceive Loretto's hairstyle as 
"negative." R. 274. Again, it is clear from the context of Ms. 
Bingham's remarks that the hairstyle was "negative" because she 
associated it with gang affiliation, not because it was merely 
unattractive. 
Counsel alerted the trial court to the fact that Ms. 
Bingham's association between Loretto and Mexican gang members 
based on his hair and clothing style tainted the jury. R. 272-
74. The motion was timely, and the basis for Loretto's objection 
was clear. It seems unlikely that the trial court somehow missed 
the point. The court had ample opportunity to address the claim 
and correct the error. 
B. Loretto Adequately Briefed His Claim That The 
Panel May Have Identified With Ms. Bingham's Bias 
Towards Loretto. 
The State also argues that Appellant failed to adequately 
brief his claim that the panel may have reacted to Ms. Bingham's 
remarks and likewise felt some bias towards him. It appears that 
the State's contention arises from a failure to grasp Appellant's 
argument rather than inadequate briefing on Loretto's part. On 
page nine of Appellant's brief, Loretto argued that Ms. Bingham's 
remarks created a two fold problem: (1) The panel heard outside 
evidence; and (2) The panel may have been biased by the remarks. 
For both those reasons the panel should have been struck. 
Loretto maintained that the trial court's subsequent voir dire 
did not render the court's error in failing to strike the panel 
4 
harmless for two reasons. See page 10 of Appellant's Opening 
Brief. The error was not harmless because: (1) The court's 
questioning was not sufficient to dispel the inference of bias 
raised by Ms. Bingham's remarks; and (2), The court's questioning 
did not address the problem of having the jury hear outside 
evidence. See pages 8-11 of Appellant's Opening Brief. 
In particular, Loretto argued that some of the jurors may 
have identified with Ms. Bingham's bias towards Loretto and felt 
some bias themselves. See page 9 of Appellant's Opening Brief. 
On page 10 of his brief, Loretto then maintained that the single 
question asked by the court was inadequate to eliminate the taint 
of Ms. Bingham's remarks. Loretto referred this Court to cases 
supporting his argument that a single question is not sufficient 
to rebut an inference of bias. See page 10 of Appellant's Brief. 
Loretto then compared this case to State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 
1377, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) where the court held that the 
trial judge's extensive, individual questioning of each juror 
dispelled any prejudice from a juror's inappropriate remarks. 
See page 10 of Appellant's Brief. On page 11 of his brief, 
Loretto also noted that because the jurors did not know that the 
case involved a question of whether Loretto was a party to a 
robbery committed by two other Mexican males, they could not 
adequately assess their own impartiality. 
Loretto clearly defined the issues, presented supporting 
case law, and argued the facts of his case. The State 
apparently did not understand that the two and half pages Loretto 
5 
devoted to discussing the adequacy of the court's additional voir 
dire applied to the argument that the inference of bias raised 
by Ms. Bingham's remarks was not dispelled. 
C. Loretto Did Not Invite Error By Indicating To 
The Court That The Panel Could Still Be 
Questioned About Ms. Bingham's Comments. 
The State's claim that Loretto invited error by 
suggesting that the trial court ask the jurors if Ms. Bingham's 
comments influenced them also appears to stem from a failure to 
understand Loretto's argument. Loretto is not claiming that the 
court erred by asking the panel if Ms. Bingham's remarks 
influenced them. Loretto is claiming that the court erred by 
refusing to the strike the panel, and that error was not rendered 
harmless by the court's subsequent question. Therefore, Loretto 
did not "lead" the court into committing an error by suggesting 
that it question the panel further. 
The invited error doctrine has two principal purposes. 
First, the trial court should be given an opportunity to address 
a claim of error. "Second, it discourages parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a 
hidden ground for reversal on appeal." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, defense counsel raised the question of the 
panel's fitness to serve in a timely and appropriate manner. R. 
271. The court listened to both sides, and denied the motion. 
R. 275. The trial court did not rely on counsel's suggestion 
that the court question the panel further when it denied the 
6 
motion to quash. It is therefore unclear how the court was 
"misled" by counsel's suggestion that if the court did not 
strike the panel, it ask the jurors if they were influenced by 
Ms. Bingham's remarks. 
The State claims that "when the trial court asked the 
question defendant requested and received no response, the trial 
court legitimately concluded that it had resolved the issue." 
See pg. 15 of Appellee's Brief. It was clear to all the parties, 
including the trial court, that the suggestion to question the 
jurors was independent of the motion to quash the panel. The 
State failed to point out in its brief that the trial court ruled 
on Loretto's motion to quash the panel before it questioned the 
panel about Ms. Bingham's remarks. R. 275. The trial court 
"resolved the issue" by denying counsel's motion, not by 
questioning the jurors as the State claims. Then it followed 
both the State and defense counsel's suggestion to question the 
panel.3 R. 275. If, as the State claims, Loretto's comments 
told the trial court that the additional question would alleviate 
the need to quash the panel, the court would not have ruled on 
the motion beforehand. Also, nowhere in the record did defense 
counsel ever state that questioning the jury was an acceptable 
substitute for striking the panel. 
It is obvious that defense counsel's suggestion that the 
3
. The State originally argued that the trial court could 
have asked the jurors if they were biased by Ms. Bingham's remarks 
but suggested that it was too late to do so. Defense counsel then 
responded by suggesting that it was not too late to question the 
jurors. R. 273 
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court question the jurors was in addition to the motion to quash 
and was not intended as a substitute for the motion to quash 
because each resulted in a different remedy. Counsel argued 
that the entire panel was tainted by Ms. Bingham's remarks. The 
remedy was to strike the whole panel and declare a mistrial. 
Counsel additionally suggested that the court question the jurors 
about potential bias. Even if several jurors had subsequently 
indicated to the court that they were biased by Ms. Bingham's 
remarks, Loretto's remedy would be to move to strike those jurors 
for cause, not to strike the entire panel. 
D. Loretto's Suggestion That The Court Also 
Question The Jurors About Ms. Bingham's Remarks 
Does Not Preclude Him From Arguing On Appeal That 
The Court's Error In Failing To Strike The Panel 
Was Not Harmless. 
The State claims that Loretto "defined the scope of the 
voir dire" and therefore cannot complain that it was insufficient 
to cure any taint. First, the State's claim ignores the fact 
that it is the trial court's duty to dispel any bias once it has 
been suggested. Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 395 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). Trial counsel's request that the court question 
the panel to determine if anyone was influenced by Ms. Bingham's 
remarks does not relieve the court of its duty. 
Second, the court did not question the panel to "cure" 
any error as the court had already determined that Ms. Bingham's 
remarks did not bias the panel when it denied Loretto's motion to 
quash. The trial court's error in failing to strike the panel 
cannot be laid at counsel's feet because the court did not "cure" 
8 
an error it did not perceive had occurred when it followed 
counsel's suggestion that the panel be questioned further. 
Lastly, it is unreasonable to suggest that if a defendant 
attempts to mitigate the court's denial of his motion to quash 
the panel by requesting additional voir dire, he waives any 
argument that the court's error was not harmless. Under the 
State's reasoning, Loretto would have preserved his argument by 
saying nothing. But, had he said nothing, he would no doubt be 
accused of inviting error by failing to request additional voir 
dire. 
E. Loretto Was Not Required To Renew His Motion 
To Quash The Panel After The Court Questioned The 
Jurors About Ms. Bingham's Remarks To Preserve 
His Claim. 
The State relies on Morgan to argue that Loretto tacitly 
withdrew his motion to quash. This case is distinguishable from 
Morgan. In Morgan the trial court did not rule on the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial, but instead questioned the 
jurors. The defendant's failure to request a ruling was seen as 
a tacit withdrawal of the motion for a mistrial. 865 P.2d at 
1381. In this case, the court already denied Loretto's motion to 
quash before questioning the jurors. It is unclear how Loretto 
can be seen to have "tacitly withdrawn" a motion he had already 
lost on the merits. Loretto made his motion, stated the grounds, 
and the court denied it. The law does not require him under 
these circumstances to "renew" the motion again, and risk the ire 
of the trial judge. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and as set forth in his initial 
Opening Brief, Loretto respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the conviction and judgment entered in the trial court and 
remand the case to the trial court either for a new trial, or 
with orders to dismiss for insufficient evidence. 
SUBMITTED this £,5^^day of April, 1997. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
MR. McKINNON: Okay. 
THE COURT: I believe that's it, is it not? 
MS. REMAL: I believe so. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock, do you have any 
5
 challenges for cause? 
6
 MR. BLAYLOCK: With the ones we've already 
7
 discussed, the first we have is No. 1, No. 2, Holly Hogarth, 
8
 No. 3, Helen Bingham, No. 6, Tamera Briggs. And I'll make a] 
9 I note of this here (indicating). That leaves us 22. 
THE COURT: And that is every one so far, is that 
correct? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: It is. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Blaylock, any challenges for cause? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, why don't we start with 
1
^ defense counsel? 
17
 THE COURT: Do you have any? 
18
 MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, let me think about that for a| 
19 moment. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Remal? 
21 MS. REMAL: First of all, your Honor, I would move] 
22 to strike the entire panel based on—let me think which one 
23 Mrs. Bingham, No. 3 juror has been excused for cause, based 
24 
upon the comments that she made, and now, none of us has anw 
25
 Way of anticipating what she was going to say when she was 
76 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
explaining why she was so upset. But she talked about 
having lost a son to suicide and then a couple of times 
mentioned the word "prejudice". 
And then, at some point, started talking about—it 
wasn't clear to me even what the connection was, if any, 
with her son's suicide, but something about, I'm still upset 
with the Mexicans that live next door to me or in my 
neighborhood. And she was looking at Mr. Loretto and 
gesturing towards him. Saying something like, and they 
dress like he did. And I don't know why he doesn't cut off, 
and kind of demonstrated the hair on the back of his neck. 
And now that wasn't responsive to any particular question 
It was just a comment she was making, trying to explain her 
1 4
 I situation. 
'5 I But I think the clear implication is, is that she 
'* ' has some prejudice against or concern about the neighbors 
17 I she has. That she, I think, was trying to express she may 
have the same concern about my client, Gilbert Loretto. An 
was pointing out to other jurors his hairstyle and I guess 
2 0
 I his manner of dress. I'm not exactly sure, but she was 
21
 I referring to my client. 
2 2
 THE COURT: He was dressed great. 
2 3
 M S . REMAL: Dressed okay, but he did have a 
2 4
 particular hairstyle that she was obviously trying to, when 
2 5
 I she demonstrated kind of to the back of her neck, that she 
77 
18 
19 
0 : "• 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
is referring to long hair at the back of the neck. 
My concern is that she has tainted the whole panel 
by doing that. And so I would move, first of all, to strike 
the whole panel for cause, for that reason. 
I also have some specific— 
THE COURT: Before you get to these, Mr. Blaylock, 
do you want to respond to that? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, your Honor, if we had known 
before, we could have asked the jurors that came in here how 
those comments affected them. I think most of them would 
have indicated that that bothered them and that they thought 
that she was—I don't think it would have influenced them in 
any way. It would have bothered them, but I think the 
attitude she had and the way she was acting was 
inappropriate; but we don't know what the jury thinks 
because we didn't ask that question. If we had known 
I before, we could have inquired of the individuals that we 
18 
1
 examined in chambers 
THE COURT: Ms. Remal, any final comment 
MS. REMAL: I guess in response to that, we could 
certainly ask the question. We could go back out and the 
19 
20 
21 
25 
2 2
 J Court could ask something like, You heard the comments that 
3
 J were made by Ms. Bingham, I guess that's her name, and is 
2 4
 ' there anybody that has been influenced in any way? I don't 
know if you want to use "influenced", or that has been 
73 
u 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
biased about that. 
And then to avoid the other similar type of 
problem, to bring them into chambers to find out what that 
means. We don't want them to say it in front of anybody 
else again. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure that I have a 
problem in asking the question. I don't think that, 
however, that she said anything that would prejudice 
anything that this defendant—well, she was describing a 
personal prejudice she has about a hairstyle and whatever 
How would that taint the other jurors 
MS. REMAL: Well, I'm afraid that the other jurors| 
would say, gee, I hadn't noticed that hairstyle. Now she's 
speaking of it and I noticed that, too. And geez, that is 
kind of a problem. That's an unusual hairstyle and wonder 
what that means, or maybe they know someone of a similar 
17
 J style. They've got a problem with that. And simply point 
18
 | that out to them. And certainly, she made it quite clear 
1® ' that for her, that's a negative thing. 
2 0
 I And it seems like others are then going to be 
particularly noticing that and maybe they will say, gee, 
maybe I think that's negative, too. I mean, that's the 
whole reason why we don't want people expressing negative 
2 4
 I opinions about defendants or witnesses or whatever, because 
2 5
 I the rest, well, it might get them thinking as well. 
79 
21 
22 
23 
-i • rf „ % O *'*' ? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
12 
13 
14 
25 
THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock, do you have any 
objection if the question is asked? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I have no objection. I think the 
Court can kind of—well, itfs already covered when the Court 
asked if there was any particular reason they would not like] 
to have themselves sitting on the jury. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll ask, and I think that 
probably that did cover it; but I'm going to go ahead and 
I ask the question and ask if Mrs. Bingham's comments in any 
' way, if they feel in any way that would affect their ability! 
11 to be fair after considering her comments. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, in regard to the other--
THE COURT: But at this point, I'm going to deny 
the motion to strike the entire panel. 
1
^ I Are there any others that you have? 
16 l
 MS. REMAL: There are, your Honor 
17
 I would move to strike No. 4, Bart Rowland, 
18 because he indicated that because someone is a police 
19
 officer, he believes that they would not lie. 
20
 THE COURT: Before you get into that, let's take 
21
 them one at a time 
22 Mr. Blaylock? 
23 MR. BLAYLOCK: A number of similar situations and 
2 4
 I I don't know that they could be avoided merely because of a 
person's position, he would be more credible 
80 
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